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The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority was right
to permit tissue typing preimplantation genetic diagnosis
O
n July 21 2004, the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (HFEA), Britain’s reg-
ulatory agency for reproductive technol-
ogies, revised its policy on
preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) for tissue typing.1 2 The authority
of the HFEA to enact such a policy was
affirmed by the UK’s highest court, the
House of Lords, on April 28 2005.3
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis com-
bines in vitro fertilisation (IVF) with
genetic testing. In PGD, embryos gen-
erally undergo biopsy prior to the eight
cell stage, followed by genetic testing for
a particular trait. Tissue typing PGD is
done to identify an embryo that is tissue
matched for a child (a future sibling)
suffering from a severe disease requiring
bone marrow or cord blood stem cell
transplantation and for whom no living
donor exists. This procedure was first
performed in 2000.4 Precise matching of
tissue types is critical to successful
tissue transplant, and the donors of
such tissues are often referred to as
‘‘saviour siblings’’.
Where a tissue matched individual
already exists, extracting bone marrow
from that individual or collecting cord
blood already in storage, rather than
creating a match, presents the most
immediate treatment alternative. Bone
marrow donation from adults or other
medically competent individuals is not
generally ethically contested, and bone
marrow donation from medically
incompetent individuals (including chil-
dren) is also permissible under certain
conditions.5 Where no living tissue
donor exists, however, intentionally
creating a donor through tissue typing
PGD is among a short list of possible
treatment options.
The July HFEA policy change makes
PGD licensable in cases where tissue
typing is the only purpose of testing.
Previously, PGD was licensable in the
UK only for disease testing, and tissue
typing PGD was permissible only when
it occurred in conjunction with a disease
test.6 The HFEA’s original policy was
founded primarily on concerns about
the physical safety of children conceived
through tissue typing PGD. Cases of
tissue typing PGD—both in combination
with, and in isolation from, disease
testing PGD—have drawn considerable
media attention and public interest.
Likewise, the HFEA’s recent revision in
policy has triggered significant criti-
cisms as well as support.
Despite its critics, the HFEA’s change
in policy represents a triumph for British
bioethics regulation and a policy worth
emulating in other jurisdictions. This
article defends the HFEA’s revised pol-
icy on tissue typing PGD by reviewing
the ethical arguments surrounding this
practice. Claims about the ethics of
tissue typing PGD are herein divided
into two categories: the potential harms
of tissue typing PGD to the future child
and its family, and the potential harms
to society at large should tissue typing
PGD become widely practised. The
starting point for this analysis is the
HFEA’s accepted regulatory stance—
that PGD may be an ethically acceptable
technology (as in the case of disease
testing); I will not attempt to argue that
disease testing PGD is (or is not)
ethically acceptable. Ultimately, this
article shows that tissue typing PGD is
an ethical procedure, and thus that the
HFEA reached the appropriate conclu-
sion in its July 2004 policy revision.
POTENTIAL HARMS OF TISSUE
TYPING PGD TO THE FUTURE
CHILD AND ITS FAMILY
Safety concerns for the embryo
In arriving at its new policy, concerns
about the physical safety of children
created through PGD were foremost in
the minds of HFEA regulators. The
HFEA initially concluded that the safety
risks associated with IVF and embryo
biopsy (interventions required for tissue
typing PGD) would only be acceptable if
balanced against the potential benefits
of identifying and avoiding the birth of a
child with an inherited genetic disorder
(as with tissue typing performed in
conjunction with disease testing PGD).6
In reconsidering this policy, the HFEA
concluded that the risks of these inter-
ventions are acceptable regardless of
whether tissue typing PGD is done in
conjunction with, or in isolation from,
disease testing.6
In assessing the physical safety risks
of PGD to the future child, it is crucial to
recognise that embryo death did not
concern the HFEA in this context. The
Warnock Report, the precursor to the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology
(HFE) Act, stated: ‘‘though the human
embryo is entitled to some added
measure of respect beyond that
accorded to other animal subjects, that
respect cannot be absolute…’’.7 This
sentiment has been reconfirmed in a
recent report from the House of
Commons Committee on Science and
Technology, which concluded: ‘‘While it
has been argued that there have been
many scientific developments and
changes in social attitudes, the
Warnock Committee’s approach to the
status of the embryo remains valuable’’.8
Moreover, disease testing PGD involves
the elimination of embryos affected
with a specific genetic condition, while
the existence of cryopreserved healthy
embryos following IVF for infertility
may result in abandonment or disposal
of such embryos.
The primary concern in evaluating
risks for PGD is instead the potential
for non-fatal negative effects of IVF or
embryo biopsy. Some available evidence
has indicated that IVF may magnify the
risks for major birth defects.9 Because
tissue typing PGD conducted in isolation
from a disease test does not involve the
potential benefit that disease testing
PGD provides—avoiding the birth of a
diseased child—the risks of IVF may not
be ethically permissible.
The Medical Research Council in
Britain recently published a report
reviewing knowledge and research gaps
in the development and safety of IVF
and related techniques. The report con-
cluded that much more data are
required before firm conclusions may
be drawn about the relative and long
term health and safety risks of IVF and
related technologies.10 A lack of stan-
dard lab techniques and culture media
among IVF clinics further compounds
the difficulties of obtaining clear infor-
mation about the safety of assisted
reproduction.
In the context of PGD, the available
data are even less clear because they do
not evaluate IVF risks for infertility
patients separately from IVF risks for
PGD patients many of whom are fertile.
Infertility can occur in conjunction with
other genetic abnormalities. For instance,
imprinting errors—a component of IVF
linked risks—have been shown to corre-
late with certain sperm defects.11
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Consequently, some portion of the addi-
tional birth defects observed in IVF babies
may be due to genetic defects in the
gametes rather than to the safety of IVF.
Available evidence for the safety of
embryo biopsy may be clearer, as it is
based on considerable research invol-
ving both non-human and human
embryos. Findings in animal trials sug-
gest the safety of embryo biopsy,12 13 as
does subsequent research on human
embryos.14 Moreover, in reconsidering
its policy on tissue typing PGD, the
HFEA undertook a lengthy review of
available evidence on the safety of
interventions required for PGD (includ-
ing embryo biopsy).15 The report con-
cluded that, although more data are
required, available evidence suggests the
safety of embryo biopsy and of PGD.
Other recent studies of PGD outcomes
have concluded that the risk of birth
defects is no greater for PGD babies than
for those conceived naturally, indicating
that neither IVF nor embryo biopsy
poses a serious threat to embryos.16 17
Although these findings may not be
exhaustive or entirely conclusive, the
latest data suggest the overall safety of
PGD. The HFEA now supports these
findings, having concluded that there is
little scientific ground on which to
prevent tissue typing PGD.
Furthermore, even if there were
demonstrable safety risks, it is possible
that these risks would be insufficient
cause to prohibit tissue typing PGD,
while still allowing disease testing PGD
to continue. Sheldon and Wilkinson
have argued in this journal that it is a
mistake to consider children born fol-
lowing disease testing PGD as the
recipients of any significant benefits
different from those accruing to chil-
dren born following tissue typing PGD.18
As the HFEA’s initial policy for tissue
typing PGD indicated, disease testing
PGD is generally assumed to deliver
significant benefits to the future child
by preventing the birth of a diseased
child. On this understanding, tissue
typing PGD differs from this model in
that the primary benefits of the proce-
dure are assumed to fall to the sibling in
need of a tissue transplant rather than
to the future child.
Sheldon and Wilkinson remind us,
however, that PGD does not alter the
DNA in an embryo in any way; this
means that if a given embryo is found to
be disease free following PGD, then that
embryo would have been disease free
even in the absence of the PGD test.
Thus, no direct benefit accrues to a
specific embryo through PGD of any
kind, other than increasing the
embryo’s probability of being returned
to the womb for development, and this
benefit only applies for an embryo of the
desired genotype. For a given embryo,
the harms and benefits of selection are
equal in tissue typing PGD and disease
testing PGD. Safety considerations war-
ranting the prohibition of one PGD
procedure would speak equally strongly
against another. As disease testing PGD
is permissible and ethically acceptable in
the UK, Sheldon and Wilkinson argue
convincingly that concerns about the
physical safety of children created
through PGD may not be sufficient to
prohibit the use of PGD for tissue
typing.
Instrumentalisation at conception
Many critics of the HFEA’s new policy
have focused on the supposed instru-
mentalisation of the embryo selected
through tissue typing PGD for develop-
ment. As Kevin Male, spokesperson for
the British antiabortion group Life,
explained: ‘‘In essence a white coated
technician brought this human being
into the world simply as a means to an
end’’.19 For Male and his supporters, the
wrongness of tissue typing PGD stems
from the fact that it is a procedure
undertaken simply for the benefit of
another. The embryo is subjected to PGD
not to ensure the birth of a healthy
child, but in order to serve the need of a
sibling for a tissue matched donor.
The charge of instrumentalisation has
come from a variety of different per-
spectives. Most often, however, claims
about instrumentalisation rely on
Kant’s universal prescription to ‘‘act
that you use humanity, whether in your
own person, or in the person of any
other, always at the same time as an
end, never simply as a means’’.20
Essentially, in the context of assisted
reproduction, Kant’s dictum demands
that a child be wanted for her own sake,
and not simply for sake of others.21
Conceiving a child in order to harvest
her bone marrow or cord blood stem
cells is unethical when it treats the child
solely as a means to the end of saving
her sibling’s life.
Marshalling Kant in this fashion is,
however, problematic in two ways. First,
it is not clear that Kant’s categorical
imperative applies to embryos or future
children. Kant defines personhood with
reference to rationality, which is a
characteristic neither embryos nor
abstract future persons exhibit. Second,
even if we allow Kant’s dictum to be
applied in this case, Male’s criticism
fails because it is not necessarily the
case that parents pursuing tissue typing
PGD will conceive a child simply as a
means to an end. Male’s criticisms
reflect a lack of appreciation for the
distinction between using someone as a
means to an end and using someone
simply as a meanss to an end. Society
might legitimately condemn the parents
whose only care for a child conceived
through tissue typing PGD is for the
stem cells the procedure will generate to
save their sick child’s life. If this were
so, the child would be conceived simply
as a means to that end. It is not true of
necessity, however, that parents seeking
tissue typing PGD will have such sim-
plistic motives. Families whose tissue
typing PGD applications have come
before the HFEA have stated a desire
to have additional children, as well as
the wish to aid their sick child through
selecting a matched donor embryo.22
Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that
parents willing to go to such extraor-
dinary lengths to save their existing sick
child are likely to be the sort of parents
who would care deeply for each of their
children in their own right.23 Although
the use of tissue typing PGD cannot
provide absolute certainty that parents
will view their future child with the
same love and respect as their existing
child(ren), neither can it prove the
opposite. The use of the tissue typing
PGD procedure should not be deemed
prima facie evidence that the parents are
conceiving their future child simply as a
means to an end.
Instrumentalisation after birth:
exploitation and coercion
Lord Robert Winston, a prominent
doctor and a critic of the HFEA’s initial
tissue typing PGD policy, stated that in
approving tissue typing PGD, ‘‘we would
be producing a child that would have
been born with completely the wrong
expectations for it. It would be beholden
to the older sibling and could not be a
child in its own right.’’22 Specifically,
Winston envisioned a child that, once
born, would be forced to serve as blood
donor to its sibling all its life.22
(Interestingly, Winston now supports
tissue typing PGD.24) Other groups
expressed similar fears, predicting a
scourge of babies bred for spare
parts.25 26 One group of authors asserted:
‘‘the donor child is at lifelong risk of
exploitation, of being told that he or she
exists as an insurance policy and tissue
source for the sibling, of being repeat-
edly subjected to testing and harvesting
procedures, of being used this way no
matter how severe the psychological and
physical burden, and of being pressured,
manipulated, or even forced over
protest.’’27
Because tissue matched siblings serve
as the best possible donors for any kind
of tissue or organ transplant, fears about
the future coercion or exploitation of
one child for the benefit of another are
not without merit. Such claims about
the fate of the future child ignore the
aim of tissue typing PGD, however, as
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well as the status of tissue donation by
minors in law and ethics. Tissue typing
PGD seeks to use the stem cells available
in the umbilical cord of the newly born
child. The harvest of the necessary tissue
is not harmful to the newborn child (or
its mother). Ordinarily, the umbilical
cord is considered waste material and
would otherwise be discarded.
Nevertheless, in the event that the
cord blood transfusion failed, the infant
might become a candidate for bone
marrow donation. From the beginning,
the HFEA recognised that although it
‘‘could not place conditions on a treat-
ment license that would allow them to
stop any future bone marrow transplant
from taking place…there were proce-
dures designed to protect child bone
marrow donors in place already and
such a child would enjoy the same
protection as any other child…’’.28 A
child born through tissue typing PGD is
no different from any other child in the
eyes of the law, and the same rights,
responsibilities, and protections apply.
Although present UK legislation does
not speak explicitly to tissue and organ
donation by minors, it is extremely
unlikely that a court would approve
the harvesting of non-replaceable
organs from a minor29—a restriction on
organ procurement common in other
European and international policies.
Thus, just as no naturally conceived
tissue matched child could legally func-
tion as a source of spare parts for its
sibling, no child intentionally conceived
as a tissue match could legally fill such a
role.
Psychosocial harms after birth
In addition to fears of actual physical
coercion of the future child, critics of
tissue typing PGD have also expressed
concerns that the future child will
experience emotional and psychological
harms as a result of being born, even in
part, for someone else’s benefit. Both
the HFE Act,30 and the HFEA Code of
Practice,31 reflect this concern about the
psychosocial wellbeing of children con-
ceived through assisted reproductive
technologies by requiring that practi-
tioners and regulators make an evalua-
tion of the ‘‘welfare of the child’’ before
proceeding with treatment. The sources
of potential psychological harms are
many and include fears that the future
child may feel that she is nothing more
than a source of spare parts for her
sibling,27 may experience feelings of
inadequacy if the stem cell transfusion
is unsuccessful,32 or may lose some
sense of unconditional love from her
parents by being born in part to serve an
identifiable purpose.33
These remain at best speculative fears
because no one knows quite what the
psychological effects of having been
conceived through tissue typing PGD
might be. Tissue typing PGD has only
been possible since 2000, meaning that
the oldest children born through this
procedure have yet to reach adolescence,
when children undergo separation indi-
viduation—learning to be psychologi-
cally independent from family and
seeking one’s own identity34—which
may be more difficult for children
conceived, in part, as tissue donors for
family members. Psychosocial data from
teenaged children conceived through
tissue typing PGD are critical to asses-
sing the real harms and benefits of
being born in part to serve as a tissue
donor. Thus, we should not downplay or
ignore fears about the potential psycho-
social harms of tissue typing PGD,
however speculative; indeed, we should
be monitoring their occurrence. This
emphasis on further study and monitor-
ing is consistent with the conclusions
reached by the HFEA in its 2004 report
on tissue typing PGD.15 Lack of con-
clusive evidence notwithstanding, we
should not allow speculative concerns
to dictate present policy.
Moreover, the Ayala family is an
interesting test case for psychological
speculations about ‘‘saviour siblings’’. In
1990, the Ayalas were the first family to
‘‘go public’’ with their attempt to have a
child that could serve as a tissue donor
for their sick older child, Anissa.35
Today, Marissa Eve Ayala, Anissa’s
‘‘saviour sibling’’, is a happy, healthy,
normal, and loved teenager and a
positive example of the psychological
impact of being a ‘‘saviour sibling’’.36
Although Marissa Eve was conceived
without the aid of tissue typing PGD,
the psychological ramifications of her
conception are likely to be similar to
those of tissue typing PGD children.
Although the Ayalas’ experience does
not prove that positive psychological
effects will always result with the
purposeful creation of a donor sibling,
it does demonstrate that negative con-
sequences need not follow.
The ethics of the alternatives
Where no living tissue matched donor
exists, one possible way forward is to
create a donor through natural concep-
tion, where there is a one in four chance
that the resulting child will be tissue
compatible to her sibling and, therefore,
able to serve as a possible tissue donor.
Parents unwilling or unable to employ
tissue typing PGD might choose to take
the genetic gamble offered in natural
conception (in many cases, parents
seeking permission in the UK to pursue
tissue typing PGD have already taken –
and lost – this gamble).
One British family, the Whitakers,
took this gamble and had a daughter
that is not tissue matched to their ill
child. Another British family, the
Hashmis, gambled twice, once giving
birth to an unmatched child and once
aborting a fetus that would have suf-
fered from the same heritable genetic
disorder as its older brother for whom a
tissue donor was sought.
In many ways, naturally conceiving a
tissue matched donor might seem to be
less ethically controversial than pur-
posefully selecting a match. Natural
conception requires no medical inter-
vention, and therefore it falls more
directly within the reproductive rights
of the parents. Whether the motives of
the parents are ethically questionable in
this case is generally outside state
interests, as parents are free to repro-
duce for whatever reason or for no
reason at all. Conceiving a child in order
to save the life of its older sibling is a
much more worthy goal for reproduc-
tion than some others about which the
law is silent—for instance, having a
child to ‘‘save’’ a failing relationship or
to carry on the family name.
Natural conception to produce a
tissue matched sibling may, however,
be paired with prenatal diagnosis to
determine the fetus’s tissue type prior to
birth. In these cases, parents have
sometimes, though rarely, been pre-
pared to seek abortion of a fetus that
does not bear the desired tissue type.37
In Britain, natural conception followed
by prenatal diagnosis for tissue type and
termination of pregnancy is a legally
available option for parents.38 This pro-
cess imposes considerable physical and
psychological risks for conceiving cou-
ples, particularly women who must
carry (and possibly terminate) the
fetus.39 Moreover, in a culture that
accords developing human life respect
and consideration in proportion to its
development of human characteris-
tics,7 8 abortion—the elimination of a
fetus—must necessarily be less ethically
acceptable than PGD, which may result
in the elimination of embryos. In its
evaluation of tissue typing PGD, the
HFEA ethics committee acknowledged:
‘‘In considering alternatives to the pro-
posed class of treatments…the approach
of natural conception combined with
selective abortion until a suitable preg-
nancy was identified through (postim-
plantation) prenatal diagnosis is much
less acceptable’’.40 Thus, although nat-
ural conception may be preferable to
planned embryo selection, the selective
forces employed to ensure the presence
of the desired tissue type are much less
acceptable in cases of prenatal diagnosis
as compared with preimplantation
diagnosis.
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POTENTIAL HARMS OF TISSUE
TYPING PGD TO SOCIETY AT
LARGE
Enhancement and the slippery
slope
One of the HFEA’s primary responsibil-
ities is to balance the interests of private
individuals in making reproductive
choices against the interests of society
at large in imposing restrictions on
those choices. Traditional PGD aims to
ensure the birth of a child that is free
from a specific genetic disorder. With
tissue typing PGD, selection is for a trait
with no known health benefits for the
embryo that is biopsied and implanted;
instead the goal is to generate cord
blood stem cells (and potentially other
tissues, such as bone marrow) needed to
treat an existing and sick child. For
some, this shift opens the door for the
use of PGD to select for non-medical
traits, including intelligence, appear-
ance, and behaviour.23 41
To be sure, tissue typing PGD is a new
brand of PGD, in so far as the benefits
and burdens of IVF and embryo biopsy
fall on different individuals. Tissue
typing PGD does not promote the birth
of a healthy child, where, in the absence
of PGD, a child suffering from a
hereditary genetic disorder might have
resulted. This difference in intention
does not, however, irrevocably lead to
non-medical applications of PGD tech-
nology. There is no connection between
choosing a trait that benefits another
(as in tissue typing PGD) and choosing a
non-medical trait that benefits the self
(as in enhancement PGD). In equating
tissue typing PGD with enhancement,
these critics misdescribe the shift in
policy enacted by the HFEA. The HFEA’s
2004 policy does not permit a shift in
focus from health outcomes to enhance-
ment; instead, it permits a shift in focus
from the health of the biopsied embryo
to the health of another—admittedly a
controversial shift, but not of the kind
identified by people concerned about
enhancement and the slippery slope.
Disease testing PGD is designed to
secure healthy children. Tissue typing
PGD is aimed at that same end.
Discrimination
At least one author has linked tissue
typing PGD to increased discrimination
against the disabled. ‘‘[A]ttitudes may
be fostered that promote discrimination
against the sick or disabled because they
were not ‘designed’ properly prior to
birth’’.42 Interestingly, this claim is more
often levelled at disease testing PGD
because that procedure intentionally
selects against individuals bearing dis-
ease causing traits. By contrast, tissue
typing PGD aids in treating an illness
already present in another individual. It
seeks to improve the condition of the
individual suffering from disease, not
eliminate her. Tissue typing PGD makes
cord blood available for transplant,
which is an ethically acceptable treat-
ment for these conditions. The treat-
ment goal inherent in tissue typing PGD
indicates that it may be less discrimina-
tory toward disabled persons—and
therefore less slippery—than its disease
testing counterpart: ‘‘the explicit pur-
pose of the treatment is to cure a
(particular) condition that already
exists, not to eradicate the condition
from the gene pool’’.42
Perhaps significantly, the selection for
tissue type itself does not affect the
future child in any meaningful way. The
child will not be taller, shorter, thinner,
fatter, or anything else as a result of
PGD. She will simply be able to provide
the cord blood stem cells necessary to
save her sibling’s life. The aspect of non-
personal benefit inherent in tissue typ-
ing PGD insulates the procedure from
many of the slippery slope risks inherent
in other proposed forms of genetic
selection.
Allocation of scarce resources
Britain provides full health benefits for
its citizens, sometimes including IVF
and PGD. At present, women between
the ages of 23 and 39 are eligible to
receive one cycle of IVF covered by the
National Health Service.43 The HFEA’s
decision to license tissue typing PGD
may create pressure to expand PGD
coverage under the National Health
Service. Although a discussion about
the economics of tissue typing PGD has
not yet been advanced, there should be
some evaluation of the relative costs of
funding this procedure in a publicly
funded health system. When there are
hundreds of thousands of patients with
various health needs, allocating
resources to tissue typing PGD requires
evidence that it is a reasonable expen-
diture of finite public healthcare
resources.
Tissue typing PGD is, in fact, cost
effective. The lifetime treatment costs
for a single patient suffering from beta
thalassaemia (one disease treatable
through cord blood transfusion) is
estimated at more than £200,000.44 The
treatment costs for many other condi-
tions that tissue typing PGD can help
treat are likewise prohibitive.
Conversely, an IVF cycle with PGD can
cost £4,000 to £7,000,45 or roughly
£3,000 more than the costs of traditional
IVF.46 Given the moderate successful
pregnancy rates for PGD (23–35%, in
part depending on the medical indica-
tion for which PGD is used17) it is likely
that patients pursuing tissue typing
PGD will need to undergo multiple
treatment cycles to achieve a successful
pregnancy, yielding higher costs ranging
from £12,000 to £28,000. The extraction
and transfusion of bone marrow costs
approximately £35,000 to £80,000,47
with the equivalent processes in cord
blood stem cell transfusion being sub-
stantially less expensive.48 In other
words, the cost of tissue typing PGD,
including the postnatal treatment costs
associated with cord blood collection
and transfusion, will likely be less than
half the lifetime treatment costs of
caring for a sick individual, even if
pregnancy results only once in three
IVF cycles. Thus, tissue typing PGD
represents a cost effective treatment
option when no matched donor exists.
CONCLUSION
Given the available data, the HFEA’s
new policy on tissue typing PGD is
undeniably more fair and ethical than
its previous, bifurcated policy distin-
guishing between tissue typing PGD
performed in conjunction with, versus
in isolation from, disease testing PGD.
The House of Lords has also recently
issued a ruling affirming the HFEA’s
jurisdiction in regulating and licensing
PGD. Although more data are needed
about the physical safety and psychoso-
cial risks of tissue typing PGD, a lack of
conclusive evidence at present should
not trigger the prohibition of a demon-
strated lifesaving procedure. Current
data suggest that PGD is likely to pose
minimal physical health risks for proper
fetal and postnatal development,
whereas anecdotal evidence about the
psychological impact of being born as a
donor sibling includes favourable early
reports. These concerns deserve contin-
ued study and reconsideration, but
patients seeking tissue typing PGD
should be permitted to proceed with
appropriate oversight. This is precisely
the conclusion that the HFEA reached in
reassessing its policy for tissue typing
PGD.
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